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§0 Introduction 
What is the compositional structure of reality? 
That  question  divides  naturally  into  these  two:  What  is  the  compositional 
structure of the particulars that populate reality? And what is the structure of the 
properties and relations that fix what these entities are like? 
David Lewis’s work in ontology and mereology provides the materials for an 
extraordinarily clean answer to the first question. First, among the particulars
1 that 
populate reality are mereological simples: entities that have no proper parts. (A plausible 
candidate  for  these  simples:  spacetime  points.)  Second,  every  collection  of  such 
entities has a unique mereological fusion. And third, every particular is either a simple, or 
a fusion of simples.
2 That’s it. 
I propose to take this answer on board.
3 What, then, about our second question? 
Here it looks as though we can draw on an additional Lewisian thesis:  
 
Joints: There is a distinction – at the level of metaphysics – between more and less 
natural properties. Some properties (having mass 1 gram, perhaps) are perfectly natural; 
others (being a methane molecule, perhaps) are less-but-still-quite natural; still others 
(being  grue i s  a  f a v o r i t e )  a r e  n o t  v e r y  n a t u r a l  a t  a l l .  T h i s  d i s t i n c t i o n  e a r n s  i t s  
philosophical  keep  because  of  the  number  and  centrality  of  the  philosophical 
projects that must presuppose it. And to say that this distinction resides at the level 
of metaphysics is, at least in part, to say that it is not grounded in facts about 
human psychology. 
 
                                                 
1 Note that the restriction to “particulars” is in place because Lewis allows that there might be 
other sorts of entities – e.g., repeatable universals. 
2 I said that Lewis’s work provides the materials for this answer. It is much less clear whether 
Lewis himself endorsed this answer; the textual evidence is somewhat ambiguous. At any rate, if he 
did, he endorsed it as a contingent thesis; see for example the opening section of his 1994. I myself 
prefer the view that this answer, if correct, is metaphysically necessary but a posteriori; see my 2011a. 
3 Though  only  for  the  purposes  of  this  essay:  there  are,  after  all,  reasonable  grounds  for 
reservations. What about holes, for example? The gyrations Argle goes through (Lewis & Lewis, 1970) 
to accommodate them suggest to me that a more relaxed view in ontology is called for, one that 
agrees that the existence of any non-fundamental particular must be appropriately grounded in facts 
about  fundamental  entities  – v i z . ,  m e r e o l o g i c a l  s i m p l e s  – w i t h o u t  a g r e e i n g  t h a t  e v e r y  n o n -
fundamental particular must be composed of fundamental ones. The Large-Scale Joints of the World      2 
What Joints tells us, in effect, is that there are objective joints in nature that appear at 
different mereological scales, constituted by the pattern of instantiation of natural 
properties  and  relations  by  the  particulars  that  exist  at  those  scales.  That  is  an 
attractive picture, but please note that it is nothing more than a picture. Whereas we 
were able to get a complete and exact answer to the first of our two questions about 
the  compositional  structure  of  reality  –  thanks  to  the  fact  that  the  version  of 
mereology that our answer drew upon was itself clear and exact – what we have here 
is no more than a framework for such an answer. It needs to be filled out in at least 
two ways: we need an account of what naturalness of properties and relations is; and 
we need an account of how naturalness at one scale fits together with naturalness at 
other scales. 
Now, these accounts ought, I think, to be constrained by the need to make sense 
of one of the central aims of empirical inquiry, especially mature empirical inquiry – i.e., 
scientific inquiry. And that aim is to provide us inquirers with explanations for why our 
world  behaves  the  way  it  does.  As  it  happens,  Lewis  (1986b)  also  defended  an 
interesting and important thesis about what such explanations consist in: 
 
Causal Explanation: To explain an event is to give some information about its 
history of causes. Since causation is both transitive – if event A is a cause of event B, 
and B of C, then A is thereby a cause of C – and egalitarian – even background 
‘enabling conditions’ of an event count as causes of it, notwithstanding the oddity 
of saying so in ordinary conversation – the causal history of a typical event will 
almost certainly be vast beyond any possibility of full and accurate conveying. And 
so, in any particular context in which we seek understanding of why some event 
occurred, pragmatic factors will play a large role in fixing how much and which 
parts of that event’s causal history ought to be highlighted. But that is a quite 
unexceptional intrusion of pragmatics, and one that ought to make no difference to 
the  philosophical  project  of  saying  what  sort  of  information  explanatory 
information is. That project is completed – in the case of events, anyway – once we 
identify  information  explanatory  of  them  with  information  about  their  causal 
histories. 
 
What I would like to explore in this essay are the prospects for fleshing out 
Joints and Causal Explanation in a way that makes for a unified package. Troubles 
will quickly appear: as to Joints, it will emerge that there is no obvious way to say 
how the distinctions in naturalness that reside at the most fundamental mereological 
scales ground such distinctions at higher scales, while preserving the view that these 
latter distinctions are (like the former) perfectly objective. As to Causal Explanation, it 
will  emerge  that  Lewis  has  overlooked  something  of  great  importance  to  us  as 
inquirers who seek to understand our world, which is knowledge not merely of the 
causes of some given phenomenon, but knowledge of that in virtue of which the The Large-Scale Joints of the World      3 
causes are causes. Only when augmented by this latter sort of information does a 
causal  explanation  of  some  event  achieve  the  right  sort  of  explanatory  depth ( t o  
borrow Michael Strevens’s apt expression; see his 2009). 
The troubles for Joints and the troubles for Causal Explanation are, I think, 
connected. To say exactly why will require a bit of spelling out, so here I will just 
offer some teasers. 
To achieve a decent philosophical account of what explanatory depth consists in, 
we  will  need  to  supplement  Lewis’s  idea  that  explanatory  information  is  causal 
information  with  the  distinctively  unificationist  idea  that  we  improve  our 
understanding of our world by finding ways to organize our information about it in a 
cognitively effective fashion. Adding this dose of unificationism yields a view according to 
which, at least at scales above the most mereologically fundamental, the distinctions 
that we as empirical inquirers find most explanatorily valuable to draw derive their 
explanatory  value  in  part  from  the  way  in  which  they  collectively  organize,  in  a 
cognitively effective manner, our view of the subject matter that is the target of our 
inquiry. So it turns out that it is partly a matter of human psychology what makes for 
an explanatorily valuable distinction (at least, on the assumption that it is in part a 
matter of human psychology what makes for effective cognitive organization). So, 
since talk of nature’s “joints” just is talk of those distinctions in nature grasp of which 
is essential for explanation, it follows that the joints in nature (at least, at scales above 
the most mereologically fundamental) are what they are in part because of facts 
about human psychology.  
But lest you think I’m succumbing to the “postmodern forces of darkness” (to 
use  Sider’s  delightful  phrase;  see  his  2011),  let  me  highlight  two  important 
qualifications: first, nothing in what I will argue will suggest that the most fundamental 
joints in nature – the joints that it is the job of fundamental physics to discern – are 
to any extent of human origin. Second, the conception of nature’s joints that I will 
sketch  is  perfectly  consistent  with  the  view  that  the  world  possesses  a  rich  and 
completely objective causal structure. It is just that in organizing our view of this 
causal structure, we must impose on it certain taxonomies. And the way in which we 
do  so  –  more  exactly,  the  fact  that  certain  ways  of  imposing  taxonomies  are 
explanatorily better than others – cannot itself be explained merely by reference to that 
causal structure: that structure does not, as it were, force upon us, merely by virtue of 
its internal nature, certain ways of organizing it.  
Let me now try to unpack all this. We’ll begin by digging a little more deeply into 
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§1 Natural, non-natural, more and less natural 
Let’s start by getting a little clearer on what the natural/non-natural distinction is, 
and then reviewing Lewis’s case for taking the distinction on board. After that, we 
can consider the complications that arise from trying to give a philosophical account 
of how this distinction can come in degrees. 
The distinction is meant to divide properties and relations into those that are 
somehow genuine – reflecting or constitutive of real distinctions in the world – and 
those that are somehow artificial or gerrymandered – reflecting, perhaps, nothing more 
than an arbitrary, purely conventional decision to use a certain label in a certain way. 
Here is another way to put the idea. Consider all the entities that there are, or that 
there possibly could have been; indulge, for the moment, Lewis’s odd view that the 
latter sorts of entities exist in exactly the same sense as the former. (That indulgence 
will make things simpler; it’s not essential.) Consider all the sets that can be formed 
from these elements – the power set of reality, if you like. Some of these sets will 
group together entities that, somehow, belong together: all the actual and possible 
electrons, say, or all the methane molecules, or all the wombats. Others will fall short 
of this ideal. There is the set that contains all the electrons, and all the wombats. Or 
the set that contains all the electrons that exist in worlds with at least one wombat, 
together with all the protons that exist in worlds with no wombats. And so on. Once 
you see what’s going on, you’ll see that the vast majority of these sets will fail to group 
together  entities  that  are  alike  in  some  genuine  respect  (and  fail  much  more 
dramatically than the two foregoing examples – both of which, after all, could at least 
be described in English). For short: among all the groupings that, set-theoretically 
speaking,  there  are,  only  a  small  minority  correspond  to  real  distinctions  in  the 
world.
4  
Why believe in such a distinction among distinctions? Well, it’s likely that you 
already  do  –  at  least,  if  you  understood  the  brief  exposition  given  in  the  last 
paragraph. But for all that, you might reasonably doubt that the natural/non-natural 
distinction is objective, in the sense that what it is for a property or relation to count as 
“natural” has nothing to do with human psychological responses to the world we 
inhabit. To begin to rebut this worry, as well as to flesh out our explication of the 
distinction, we should appreciate two reasons to endorse it that draw on aspects of 
                                                 
4 The last few sentences have tacitly restricted our attention to properties. But the natural/non-
natural distinction applies to relations, as well. To handle, say, two-place relations, we should start by 
considering all possible pairings of (actual and possible) entities, and then consider all the sets of those 
pairings, the vast majority of which will correspond, so the thought goes, to no genuine way in which 
two things can be related. And so on, for 3- and more place relations. The Large-Scale Joints of the World      5 
our ordinary thought and talk about the world that are so intimate and familiar as to 
readily escape notice.  
The first reason has to do with change. When Billy falls in love with Suzy, that is a 
genuine change in Billy; but it is not a genuine change in Suzy, notwithstanding the 
fact that she goes from lacking the property of being loved by Billy to having this 
property. So – and this is, of course, a perfectly familiar point in the philosophical 
literature – not every gain or loss of a property by a thing counts as a genuine or 
objective change in that thing. But if we maintain (as we should) the idea that every 
change in a thing is a gain or loss of a property by that thing, and that at least some 
change  is  a  perfectly  objective  feature  of  the  world,  then  we  need  an  objective 
distinction among properties to say which gains or losses of properties count.  
Second, while some similarities and differences among entities are no doubt in 
the eye of the beholder, some are not. Two methane molecules are more similar to 
each  other  than  either  is  to  a  tomato,  period.  A  comprehensive  scheme  for 
taxonomizing the items that populate our world that failed to recognize this fact 
would, whatever its other virtues, fall short in one epistemically crucial respect: it 
would fail to correctly limn one aspect of the world’s structure. If we take this sort of 
structure to be an objective feature of the world – again, as it seems we should – and 
we take it to be constituted by the facts about which properties entities share or fail 
to share, then we need an objective distinction among properties to say which are 
those whose pattern of instantiation fixes the structure of the world. (Compare Sider 
2011.) (Arguably, the first point, about change, is just an instance of the second: 
from  a  suitably  exalted  space-time  perspective,  to  talk  about  change  is  just  to 
highlight temporal aspects of the world’s overall spatiotemporal structure.) 
If  we  begin  with  this  intuitive  distinction  between  natural  and  non-natural 
properties and relations, we can get part way to Lewis’s conception of perfectly natural 
properties  and  relations  simply  by  maxing  out  one  criterion:  whereas  sharing  of 
natural properties makes for similarity, sharing of perfectly natural properties makes 
for perfect similarity, or duplication.  
Consider the property of being a methane molecule. Any two things that share 
this property – i.e., any two methane molecules – will ipso facto be quite similar to 
one  another.  But  they  need  not  be  perfect  qualitative  duplicates:  their  internal 
configurations might differ slightly, or they might be slightly different in composition 
(say, one contains a carbon-12 atom, where the other contains a carbon-13 atom). By 
contrast,  sharing  of  perfectly  natural  properties  is  supposed  to  yield  perfect The Large-Scale Joints of the World      6 
qualitative  similarity.  Thus,  Lewis  (1983b,  p.  27):  “Two  things  are  qualitative 
duplicates if they have exactly the same perfectly natural properties.”
5 
But the way in which sharing of perfectly natural properties grounds facts about 
similarity goes beyond the requirement that two objects that instantiate exactly the 
same ones are perfect qualitative duplicates. Consider two Newtonian point-particles 
that are perfect duplicates, having, say, exactly the same values for mass and charge. 
Suppose that, in some appropriate units, each particle has mass 1 and charge 1. Now, 
having  mass  1  and  having  charge  1,  let  us  agree,  are  examples  of  perfectly  natural 
properties. By contrast, here are some of the properties the particles instantiate that 
fall short of being perfectly natural (on the grounds that the sharing of them does 
not count as a way of being genuinely similar): having mass 1 or charge 2, having mass 2 or 
charge 1, having mass 1 or charge 1. But, on the assumption that it is metaphysically 
impossible for a particle to have two distinct values of mass or charge, the sharing of 
these three properties guarantees perfect duplication (at least, with respect to mass 
and charge). In short: if we take the complete intrinsic nature of a thing to be what is 
shared  between  it  and  its  perfectly  duplicates,  then  the  notion  of  “perfect 
naturalness”  imposes  an  additional  structure  on  these  complete  intrinsic  natures. 
Thus, the intrinsic nature of one of our particles is constituted by its being a point 
particle, having mass 1, and having charge 1; not (e.g.) by its being a point particle, 
having mass 1 or charge 2, having mass 2 or charge 1, and having mass 1 or charge 1.  
Furthermore,  the  perfectly  natural  properties  are  supposed  to  collectively 
constitute a kind of minimal supervenience basis for all of reality: that is, the whole 
truth about the qualitative structure of the world is supposed to be grounded in the 
pattern of instantiation of perfectly natural properties and relations, in a way that 
involves no redundancy. This requirement provides an extra reason for excluding 
such  “disjunctive”  properties  as  having  mass  1  or  charge  2  from  the  ranks  of  the 
perfectly natural, as well as a reason for so excluding “conjunctive” properties such 
as  having  mass  1  and  charge  2  (which  could  have  gained  membership,  if  our  sole 
criterion concerned whether sharing the property is a way for two things to achieve a 
sufficiently high degree of similarity).  
A few observations about Lewis’s distinction will be helpful for what follows. 
First, the philosophical importance of the distinction is not limited to its uses in 
                                                 
5 It’s clear in the context that Lewis intends the “if” to be understood as “iff”. Also, a more 
careful formulation of the idea would be the following: Two things A and B are qualitative duplicates 
iff there is a one-one mapping between those parts of A (including A itself) that instantiate perfectly 
natural properties or relations and those parts of B that do so, such that whenever some part or parts 
of A (respectively, B) instantiate some perfectly natural property or relation, the corresponding parts 
of B (respectively, A) instantiate the very same property or relation. The Large-Scale Joints of the World      7 
analytic metaphysics (or the theory of reference – more on this, in a moment). It 
appears, in addition, to be crucial for articulating what is arguably one of the central 
aims  of  physics,  which  is  to  provide  an  inventory  of  the  fundamental  physical 
magnitudes of our world. For while Lewis takes it to be a job for philosophy to 
defend the claim that some properties and relations are perfectly natural, he rightly 
takes it to be a job for physics to figure out which perfectly natural properties and 
relations happen to characterize our world. Second, notice that as soon as we grant 
that physics has this job, we can see that the distinction we want is not, or at any rate 
should not be limited to, a distinction among properties and relations: at least for the 
purposes of physics, it should be seen as a distinction among determinable magnitudes. 
(For more on this point, see Hall 2010.) Third, it is an extremely plausible thesis – 
but not, I think, an indisputable one, given that the thesis is also, ultimately, empirical 
–  that  perfect  naturalness  of  properties,  relations,  and  magnitudes  is  closely 
connected to mereology, via the thesis that the only entities that genuinely instantiate 
perfectly  natural  properties,  relations,  or  magnitudes  are  mereological  simples 
(perhaps, just points of space and time). There may be exceptions – for example, it 
may be that the topological structure of space-time is best understood as a perfectly 
natural  feature  of  it,  not  reducible  to  perfectly  natural  properties  and  relations 
instantiated by its ultimate parts. But for purposes of this essay I will simply bracket 
this issue, and take for granted that as soon as we ascend to any mereological scale 
above that of fundamental physics, the sorts of properties, relations, and magnitudes 
we encounter cannot qualify as perfectly natural. (For clutter-reduction, I will also 
henceforth mostly speak just of “properties”, even when relations and magnitudes 
are also intended.) 
Lewis  offers  a  number  of  reasons,  many  persuasive  and  all  intriguing,  for 
thinking  that  we  need  to  accept,  as  a  fundamental  metaphysical  distinction,  a 
distinction between perfectly natural properties and the rest. Set these reasons aside 
(you can find most of them in his 1983b). The question I wish to focus on, instead, is 
this: should we also take this distinction to be graded? That is, should we insist that, 
among all the properties that are not perfectly natural, some are nevertheless more 
natural than others? And if we do so insist, what sort of account can we give of what 
these gradations consist in? 
Now, as to the first question, I’m going to assume that the answer is “yes”. Lewis 
himself offers one very important reason that I’m going to set aside, which is that 
without  such  a  graded  distinction,  it  will  be  impossible  to  give  a  naturalistically 
acceptable account of the content of language and thought that does not face an 
insurmountable underdetermination problem (see the last section of his 1983b, as 
well as his 1984). I am, instead, go to lean upon a much more prosaic observation The Large-Scale Joints of the World      8 
about scientific inquiry, which is just that, regardless of the mereological scale at 
which it operates, it seems to be a central and nonnegotiable feature of such inquiry 
that it aims to develop the right sorts of descriptive resources for describing the 
structure of the world at the given scale. There are, for example, ever so many ways 
that, logically speaking, one could describe reality at the scale at which chemistry 
operates. But the chemist’s taxonomy is the best (or at the very least, one of the 
best); and I’m going to assume that to say that it is best is to say that this taxonomy 
tracks highly though not perfectly natural distinctions in nature.  
So let us grant that we cannot do without a graded distinction between more and 
less natural properties. Then how do we answer the second question – how do we 
give an account of what these gradations consist in? That turns out, I think, to be an 
extremely difficult (and open) problem. For now, I would like merely to consider and 
reject two approaches to it, as a way of highlighting how difficult it is.  
First,  one  might  simply  treat  gradations  of  naturalness  as  metaphysically 
primitive, and so unanalyzable. Superficially, this might seem an acceptable option; 
after all, Lewis himself argues that it is perfectly reasonable to accept the distinction 
between perfectly natural properties and the rest as primitive. But in fact I think this 
option is not acceptable. Here, briefly, are two reasons.  
To begin with, we have granted that the pattern of instantiation of perfectly 
natural properties completely determines the qualitative structure of the world. And 
so, facts about comparative similarities and differences among objects that exist at 
scales  above  the  most  mereologically  fundamental  are  fixed  by  this  pattern  of 
instantiation.  But  when,  in  the  course  of  scientific  (or  even  ordinary-life) 
investigation,  we  introduce  distinctions  among  the  less  than  perfectly  natural 
properties, these distinctions earn their keep only insofar as they track explanatorily 
important  similarities  and  differences  among  large-scale  objects.  So,  if  these 
explanatory distinctions are themselves ultimately grounded in facts about how the 
perfectly natural properties array themselves, then that just is to say that gradations in 
naturalness must be so grounded – and so cannot be metaphysically primitive, after 
all. 
In addition, it’s a good piece of philosophical methodology to avoid primitives 
that are ungainly. And in the present case, the imagined primitive seems too ungainly, 
since  the  way  that  gradations  in  naturalness  are  marked  is  quite  complex.  For 
example, for a chemist, the classification “being a methane molecule” will be more 
natural than the classification “being a methane molecule whose carbon atom is C-
12”: for whether the carbon atom is C-12 or C-13 will make no relevant chemical 
difference. But for a nuclear chemist, that difference is relevant, in a way that could 
reasonably  reverse  the  judgment  of  naturalness.  (It  matters,  for  example,  to t h e  The Large-Scale Joints of the World      9 
longevity  of  the  methane  molecule.)  Cases  like  this  suggest  that  the  sort  of 
naturalness that comes in degrees will exhibit a relativity to explanatory context: what 
count as the distinctions relevant to some explanatory projects may (even at the same 
mereological  scale)  differ  from  what  count  as  the  distinctions  relevant  to  distinct 
explanatory projects. That complexity of conceptual structure makes it implausible 
that  degrees  of  naturalness  are  simply  metaphysically  primitive,  and  at  any  rate 
deprives a philosophical account that treats them so of the resources it would need 
to explain this relativity to explanatory context. 
So I’m going to henceforth assume that however attractive it may be to treat the 
category of perfectly natural property as primitive (in part, presumably, because the 
sort of relativity to explanatory context just discussed does not show up at the level 
of fundamental physics), an informative account is obligatory of the gradations in 
naturalness that the less than perfectly natural properties exhibit. 
Lewis himself is perfectly aware of the need for an account of what makes one 
property more natural than another. He offers a simple and straightforward proposal, 
in  the  context  of  explaining  how  distinctions  of  naturalness  yield  distinctions  in 
eligibility of reference: 
 
Indeed, physics discovers which things and classes are the most elite of all; but 
others are elite also, though to a lesser degree. The less elite are so because they are 
connected to the most elite by chains of definability. Long chains, by the time we 
reach the moderately elite classes of cats and pencils and puddles; but the chains 
required to reach the utterly ineligible would be far longer still. (Lewis 1984, p. 228) 
 
Begin  with  a  language  whose  non-logical  vocabulary  refers  to  perfectly  natural 
properties; take this language to be rich enough that every perfectly natural property 
instantiated  in  our  world  gets  referred  to.  Given  some  less-than-perfectly-natural 
property F, there will be some predicate of our canonical language – perhaps a very 
long, complicated predicate – that expresses it. F will be more natural than some other 
less-than-perfectly  natural  property  G  just  in  case  the  predicate  expressing  F  is 
shorter than the predicate expressing G. 
The proposal pretty clearly needs some refinement. Many predicates will express 
a given property; presumably we are to pick the shortest. While we can compare two 
predicates for length, we can also compare them for simplicity. Suppose the shortest 
predicate  for  F  is  slightly  longer  –  but  significantly  simpler  – t h a n  t h e  s h o r t e s t  
predicate for G;
6 should the advantage in simplicity outweigh the disadvantage in 
                                                 
6 How would this happen? Well (for example), suppose the predicates contain quantifiers, and 
that those that appear in the predicate for F involve fewer alternations than those that appear in the 
predicate for G. The Large-Scale Joints of the World      10 
length? How shall we handle properties that are “multiply realizable”, in the specific 
sense that predicates expressing them cannot be defined in a canonical language 
whose non-logical vocabulary refers only to actual perfectly natural properties? (For 
example,  suppose  the  restriction o f  F  t o  this  world  can  be  defined  simply  and 
efficiently, whereas F itself cannot; should we count F as natural-in-our-world?) 
These are interesting questions, and perhaps even important, if our aim is to 
construct an account of the more/less natural distinction that will serve the purposes 
of a theory of the content of language and thought. But our aim here is different: it is 
to see how nature’s ultimate joints – the joints given by the pattern of instantiation 
of perfectly natural properties, the joints it is the business of fundamental physics to 
discern – give rise to the less-than-ultimate joints whose study is the province of the 
special  sciences.  (Note  well  that  I  do  not  make  Lewis’s  hasty  assumption  that  a 
more/less natural distinction suited to this task will be one and the same as the 
more/less natural distinction suited to the theory of content.) And we do not need to 
resolve the foregoing questions to see that Lewis’s proposal is on entirely the wrong 
track. 
Consider the property of being methane. One early sign of trouble for Lewis’s 
approach is that it looks as though, on that approach, it will be fixed once and for all 
whether this property is more natural than the property of being “stable” methane 
(that is, the property of being a methane molecule whose carbon atom is C-12), and 
that  is  just  because  the  facts  that  Lewis’s  approach  deems  relevant  – s h o r t n e s s  
and/or simplicity of definition in a canonical language – do not themselves exhibit 
any dependency upon explanatory context. There is, perhaps, the tiniest bit of wiggle 
room: maybe the trade-off between simplicity and length of definition could be taken 
to  vary  with  explanatory  context.  But  it  would  be  pointless  to  pursue  such  a 
loophole, for the real, underlying trouble is much more straightforward: what this 
approach deems relevant to naturalness just bears no adequate connection to what 
underlies the explanatory utility of classifications in actual scientific practice. 
A couple of examples should make the difficulty sufficient vivid. First, compare 
the property of being methane to the property of being composed of 18 particles, each of which 
is a proton, neutron, or electron (a property that most, but not all methane molecules 
share).  Here  is  something  indisputable:  the  shortest,  simplest  predicate  in  the 
canonical language expressing the first of these properties will be vastly longer and 
more complicated than the shortest, simplest predicate expressing the second. We 
know this: after all, I just all but gave the canonical predicate expressing the second The Large-Scale Joints of the World      11 
property
7, whereas, to produce the canonical predicate for the first property, one 
would  need  to  begin  with  the  standard  chemist’s  definition  of  methane  as  “a 
molecule composed of four hydrogen atoms covalently bonded to a carbon atom”, 
and proceed to unpack the predicates “is a hydrogen atom”, “is a carbon atom”, and 
“is covalently bonded to”. And doing that will require bringing to bear substantial 
resources  from  theoretical  chemistry  and  nuclear  physics.  It  would  take  a  while. 
You’re rather unlikely to find anyone patient enough to be willing to pursue this 
project. 
So,  by  the  lights  of  Lewis’s  account  of  the  less-than-perfectly-natural,  the 
property of being composed of 18 protons, neutrons, and electrons ought to be 
significantly more natural than the property of being methane. And that’s just silly. 
After  all,  methane  molecules  all  have  in  common  –  in  virtue  of  being  methane 
molecules! – a wide variety of explanatorily important features. Thanks to the way 
that  their  covalent  bonds  affect  their  structure,  they  are  all  close  to  perfectly 
tetrahedral. They are all close to the same size. They all react, chemically, in exactly the 
same  way.  And  so  on.  By  contrast,  no  explanatory  purpose  whatsoever  is  served  by 
distinguishing  the  class  of  things-composed-of-18-protons-neutrons-and-electrons. 
The vast majority of 18-pne’s in the universe, after all, are scattered, their 18 different 
parts  separated  by  light-years  of  space.  And  even  those  that  are  not  exhibit  no 
interesting or systematic behavior. (Except, of course, those that also happen to be 
methane molecules.) Just picture yourself writing a grant proposal – a serious one, 
mind you – asking for funding so that you can start a new program of research into 
18-pne’s.  
Here is a second example, that reinforces the point that greater explanatory value 
of a classification can very often point in the opposite direction from greater simplicity 
or  efficiency  of  canonical  definition.  Granted,  being  methane  is  a  useful  chemical 
property to know about. But being a saturated hydrocarbon is much more useful: it lends 
itself to a greater range of more important generalizations, as any organic chemist 
will tell you.
8⁠8 So, measured by explanatory utility, the category of hydrocarbons is a 
much more valuable one to distinguish than the category of methane molecules. But 
its  canonical  predicate  will  necessarily  be  longer  and  more  complicated  than  the 
canonical methane-predicate. (Consider, for example, that this predicate must include 
                                                 
7 Assuming that protons, neutrons, and electrons are all fundamental particles, that is. Of course 
they’re not (not protons and neutrons, anyway); but dropping this assumption would not make the 
slightest bit of difference to the plausibility of the claim that the canonical predicate expressing the 
second property will be vastly simpler and shorter than the canonical predicate expressing the first 
property. 
8 Saturated hydrocarbons are molecules composed of hydrogen and carbon, where all chemical 
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a  specification  that  the  covalent  bonds  holding  the  molecule  together  are  single, 
something that would be redundant in the methane-predicate.)  
Examples  like  these  convince  me  that  there  is  something  fundamentally 
misguided about Lewis’s account of the less-than-perfectly-natural. It may be that 
brevity and/or simplicity of canonical definition plays some role in accounting for 
how nature’s joint emerge at larger mereological scales. But it cannot be the whole 
story. 
Of course, one could resist this conclusion – if one is willing to sever the close 
connection  I  have  been  taking  for  granted  between  “natural”  and  “explanatorily 
valuable”. Perhaps that option could be profitably pursued; myself, I think it gives 
the game away. I will continue to take for granted that whatever else nature’s joints 
are, they had better turn out to be distinctions that it is of the first explanatory 
importance to know about. And so, given the failure of Lewis’s account of how 
large-scale joints are grounded in fundamental ones, it makes sense to turn to the 
theory of explanation itself for clues to an alternative. 
§2 Causal explanation and explanatory depth 
Lewis’s insight, summarized in the thesis Causal Explanation, is surely correct: to 
explain why an event occurs must involve giving information about its causal history. 
The reasons for this verdict are, I think, fairly obvious. For when we reflect on the 
abstract  structure  of  our  judgments  concerning  what  causes  what,  and  of  our 
judgments concerning what explains what, we find that they are remarkably similar – 
too similar for this to possibly be a coincidence. In particular, in both domains we 
draw a firm distinction between events knowledge of which serves as a good predictive 
basis for other events, and events that cause or explain those other events; and we draw 
these distinctions in  exactly  the  same  way. For example, if Billy throws a rock at a 
window, and we know that the rock is sufficiently hefty, very well aimed, and thrown 
with sufficient force, and that nothing stands poised to intercept it en route to the 
window, then we have an excellent basis for predicting that the window will break. 
But  whether  the  throw  explains  the  subsequent  breaking,  or  is  a  cause  of  the 
subsequent breaking, depends on what is going on in the surrounding environment – 
and depends on those goings on in exactly same way. Thus, if Suzy also throws a rock 
at the window, and her rock gets there first, then Billy’s throw neither explains nor 
causes this breaking, notwithstanding the fact that knowledge only of it would have 
allowed us to predict that the window would break. 
These observations are, I take it, perfectly familiar, and it is largely because of 
them  that  causal  theories  of  explanation  are  so  dominant  in  the  contemporary The Large-Scale Joints of the World      13 
literature, having long since supplanted the logical empiricist deductive-nomological 
model, and having successfully resisted the incursions of various other accounts that 
downplay the importance of causation to explanation.
9  
All the same, there are legitimate and serious grounds for dissatisfaction, at least 
with  Lewis’s  version  of  a  causal  theory  of  explanation.  It  will  be  instructive  to 
highlight  three,  and  then  sketch  some  ways  in  which  Lewis’s  account  might  be 
augmented and polished so as to deal with them. 
First,  the  account  remains  far  too  schematic,  without  an  account  of  what 
causation itself is. I say this, not out of some absurd notion that a philosophical 
theory  that  makes  use  of  concept  X  thereby  incurs  an  obligation  to  include  an 
analysis of X; rather, there are reasons specific to causation that make this concept a 
poor choice of primitive, in an account of explanation. One is that causal relations 
between  events  at  one  scale  are,  very  plausibly,  metaphysically  grounded  in  causal 
relations at smaller scales – and, ultimately, metaphysically grounded in the bare facts 
about  the  world’s  total  history  of  complete  physical  states,  together  with  the 
fundamental  laws  that  dictate  the  evolution  of  those  states.  We  would  therefore 
deepen  our  understanding  of  what  explanation  is  if  we  understood  how  this 
grounding works. More importantly, an account of explanation ought to make it 
clear why the acquisition of explanatory information is valuable for creatures like us – 
the sort of enterprise it makes sense to invest quite a lot of effort into. (This is a 
point that Jim Woodward has very effectively emphasized in his terrific recent work 
on explanation (Woodward 2005).) And that sort of clarity will only be achieved via 
an account of causation itself. Finally, a review of the rich philosophical literature on 
causation will reveal that there are too many unanswered questions about causation 
for us to feel comfortable that we have an adequate grip on what the causal history 
of an event is. Is causation invariably transitive? Is causation by omission the same 
thing as ordinary causation? What about causation by double-prevention? Are the 
most basic causal relata really events, or should they rather be taken to be facts? All of 
these questions, and more, remain up in the air. (See Hall & Paul 2011 for extensive 
discussion.)  
The second reason for dissatisfaction is that there is more – much more – to 
explanation  than  merely  the  explanation  of  particular  events.  In  fact,  in  mature 
scientific inquiry, it is only very rarely that the explanation of particular events takes 
center stage. (E.g., a cosmologist might have as her life’s work explaining the Big 
Bang; but you won’t find many more examples like that.) Now, Lewis is perfectly 
                                                 
9 I have in mind, for example, Kitcher’s unificationist account (1989), and accounts that lean on 
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aware  of  this  fact,  and  makes  no  pretensions  to  having  provided  a  complete 
philosophical account of explanation. Still, it is overwhelmingly plausible that the 
project  of  explaining  particular  events  bears  interesting  connections  to  the  other 
sorts of explanatory projects that scientists do put at center stage; and we shouldn’t 
be satisfied with Lewis’s account until it is developed in such a way as to make these 
connections clear.
10 
The third reason for dissatisfaction is that Lewis’s account misses something of 
great  importance  to  us  when  we  seek  the  explanation  of  a  particular  event.  An 
example will illustrate. A window has broken. Why? Because Suzy threw a rock at it. 
Now, we could obviously fill out that answer in many ways, thereby increasing the 
amount of explanatory information conveyed: we could trace the intermediate causes 
connecting Suzy’s throw to the breaking; we could trace her throw’s own causal 
origins; we could highlight the other causes contemporaneous with her throw with 
which it conspired in order to bring about the breaking. All of these ways of adding 
explanatory content Lewis’s account, of course, recognizes. But it misses a distinct 
dimension along which our explanation of the window’s breaking can be deepened. 
For what we might do instead is to highlight those aspects of Suzy’s throw in virtue of 
which it was able to bring about the breaking, distinguishing them from other aspects that 
were causally (and so explanatorily) irrelevant. For example, the mass of her rock was 
important,  but  its  color,  not  so  much.  And  we  could  go  further  still:  we  could 
articulate, even with some mathematical precision, the structure of the way in which 
the window’s breaking depended upon such factors as the rock’s mass, the angle and 
velocity of the throw, and the distance between Suzy and the window. Granted, in 
any ordinary context all of this would be overkill – but that is not the point. The 
point here is that we have a kind of information that is clearly explanatory of the 
window’s  breaking,  and  that  Lewis’s  account  misses.
11⁠11  Again  following  Strevens 
(2009), I will say that this sort of information adds to an explanation’s depth.  
                                                 
10 Lewis’s paper “Causal Explanation” includes some sketchy remarks on this topic. They do not 
suffice. 
11 There is a complication, because Lewis in various places (for example 1986d) advocated a 
theory of events according to which at least some of the information being discussed here could be 
imported into the individuation conditions for the events themselves. Thus, he distinguishes events 
that are perfectly coincident in space and time on the basis of which of their features are essential, and 
which accidental. So perhaps you could say something like this: There were many throws that took 
place, of all of which Suzy was the agent; one of these was, inter alia, essentially a throw of a rock with 
such-and-such mass, but only accidentally a throw of a rock with such-and-such color. This throw 
caused the breaking. Other of the coincident throws – e.g., the throw that was essentially of such-and-
such color a rock, but only accidentally a throw of a rock with such-and-such mass – did not. So you 
might hope – at least, if it’s really important to you to preserve the exact letter of Lewis’s account – 
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Let me now sketch an attractive approach – and one that has, I think, proved 
enormously  philosophically  fruitful  over  the  last  couple  of  decades  – t o  
understanding  causation  and  explanation.  It  will  go  a  fair  way  to  answering  the 
foregoing complaints. The central idea is extremely familiar: we should understand 
causation in terms of counterfactual dependence.  
Now, this idea needs to be developed in the right sort of way, and two points in 
particular are critical to keep in mind. First, one should not think that the proper 
route to a counterfactual theory of causation is by way of some all-purpose semantic 
account of ordinary language counterfactuals (as Lewis himself apparently did; see 
his 1979). No, the counterfactuals in question need to be specialized. My own view is 
that they should have the following archetypal form: if the state of the world at time 
t had been just as it actually is, except with respect to goings on in a particular 
localized region, and if the state local to that region had differed in such-and-such a 
way, then the state of the world at a certain other place and time would have differed 
in such-and-such a way. There is a clear story to tell about how counterfactuals of 
this  form  are  underwritten  by  the  fundamental  laws  of  nature;  see  for  example 
Maudlin 2007b or my 2011b. The basic idea is quite simple: given the alteration to 
the time-t state of the world specified in the antecedent, one simply updates the 
entire counterfactual history by plugging this state into the fundamental laws. Thus, 
this recipe shows how the fundamental laws, together of course with the totality of 
facts  about  our  world’s  history,  endows  our  world  with  a  rich  localized  dependence 
structure.  
The second point – which we will mostly set aside for the remainder of this essay 
–  is  that  it  simply  will  not  do  to  simply  identify  causal  structure  with  localized 
dependence structure. That is the lesson of cases of preemption, as for example the 
case mentioned earlier, in which Billy and Suzy both throw rocks at a window with 
deadly accuracy, but Suzy’s rock gets there first. Here we see near-perfect symmetry 
between the relations of localized dependence holding between Suzy’s throw and the 
breaking, and between Billy’s throw and the breaking; but for all that, there is a 
striking asymmetry in causation. The right response, in my view, is not to try to 
exploit  the  tiny  discrepancies  in  localized  dependence  structure  that  distinguish 
Suzy’s throw from Billy’s, but rather to recognize that part of what we’re tracking 
                                                 
explanation can simply be coded into the exact specification of the events that make up the target 
explanandum’s causal history. I rather doubt this can be done, and I’m certain it cannot be done 
without producing a philosophical theory of events that is unpleasantly cumbersome. But at any rate, 
it doesn’t really matter. The crucial point for the purposes of our discussion is simply that a good 
account of event explanation needs to recognize, somehow or other, the dimension of explanatory 
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when we track causal structure is the intrinsic structure of the processes that connect 
causes  to  effects.  But  this  story  gets  quite  complex,  and  at  any  rate,  when  told 
correctly,  it  still  vindicates  the  thought  that  in  ordinary  cases,  causal  structure  is 
relatively cleanly manifested in localized dependence structure. (Compare: we know 
better than to identify the property of being disposed to Φ under conditions C with the 
counterfactual property of being such that you would Φ if you were in conditions C; 
cases  of  masking  and  mimicking  refute  that  simple  equation.  All  the  same,  in 
ordinary  cases  the  dispositional  property  is  indeed  manifested  in  the  simple 
counterfactual behavior.) 
So suppose that – while, again, bracketing the real and important worries raised 
by  cases  of  causal  preemption  –  we  identify  the  sort  of  causal  structure  that  is 
relevant to our explanatory interests with localized dependence structure. Then the 
sources  of  dissatisfaction  mentioned  above  go  away.  We  have  an  account  of 
causal/explanatory structure that shows how this structure is grounded in features of 
our world that are metaphysically more fundamental. Without going into details, the 
account can be used to say sensible things about thorny topics such as causation by 
omission, putative counterexamples to transitivity of causation, etc. (See Hall and 
Paul  2011.)  We  can  sketch  simple  and  attractive  reasons  why  causal/exploratory 
information, so construed, is valuable to creatures like us: it is the sort of information 
in  light  of  which  we  are  able  more  effectively  to  navigate  our  world  (a  point 
emphasized by Woodward 2005), and in addition it is the sort of information that 
creatures with our limited epistemic capabilities can reasonably hope to acquire, and 
by  means  of  which  we  can  reasonably  hope  to  build  up  a  more  and  more 
sophisticated understanding of the nomological structure of our world (Hall 2011a). 
We  can  also  draw  a  connection  between  our  prosaic  practice  of  explaining 
ordinary events and the more refined and exalted explanatory aims of the sciences: 
whereas, in developing an explanation for why some particular event occurred, we 
are  aiming  to  spell  out  one  fairly  restricted  bit  of  the  world’s  overall  localized 
dependence structure, one of the central aims of the sciences is to discover  wide 
reaching and nomologically  robust  generalizations concerning this structure, and patterns 
within it. 
Finally, an account of explanatory depth falls out rather naturally. Consider our 
case of the broken window. By saying that it broke because Suzy threw a rock at it, 
we  are  conveying  a  bit  of  information  about  the  localized  dependence  structure 
within which the breaking of the window is embedded. But we are doing so only 
very crudely: we’re saying, roughly, that if the region of space in which her throw 
took place had differed just enough so that she didn’t throw (but, say, stood idly by), 
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such a way that the window did not break. We convey much more sophisticated 
information  about  the  given  localized  dependence  structure  if,  instead,  we  detail 
which  variations  on  Suzy’s  throw  would  or  would  not  have  led  to  a  breaking. Talk of the 
features of her throw in virtue of which it was a cause of the window’s breaking is 
really just talk of the contours of such variations. 
§3 A puzzle about explanatory depth 
But at this point, a puzzle emerges. Exploring it will take us directly back to the 
issues discussed in §1. To bring out the puzzle, we will draw again on our example of 
the broken window. 
Here, in the abstract, is a way to see what we’re doing when we increase the 
“depth” of our explanation of the window’s breaking, by not merely citing the fact 
that Suzy threw a rock at it, but by articulating which counterfactual variations on her 
throw would and would not have led to a breaking. We have picked out a certain 
region of space-time: the region in which Suzy’s throw takes place. Holding fixed the 
state of the rest of the world at the given time, the state of that particular region is, in 
the actual situation, such as to lawfully guarantee that the window breaks (at a certain 
time).
12 There  are  a  multitude  of  nomologically  possible  alternatives  to  the  exact 
physical state that this region instantiates. Some of these alternatives are such as to 
still lawfully guarantee the window’s breaking (at roughly the same time, and, again, 
holding fixed the state of the rest of the world at the initial time); some are not. In 
aiming for explanatory depth, it appears that we are aiming to show how exactly the 
distinction between the former sorts of alternatives (example: an alternative in which 
the color of the rock is different) and the latter sorts (example: an alternative in 
which the rock is substantially lighter) is to be drawn. 
But that can’t be right, for we are doing some something more, and something 
much more subtle. Consider that one of these nomologically possible alternative 
states of the given region is the following: Suzy has no rock in her hand, but is in the 
process of running up to the window to level a vicious kick at it. Clearly, when we try 
to deepen our understanding of why the window broke by asking which sorts of 
variations on Suzy’s throw would still have led to a breaking, we do not mean to 
include  this  scenario  as  one  of  them.  Why  isn’t  this  alternative  relevant,  in  the 
specific sense that it should be classed together, for explanatory purposes, with such 
alternatives as the one in which Suzy throws a rock of a slightly different color?  
                                                 
12 Note that we are assuming determinism here. The story is more complicated if we relax that 
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You might think the answer obvious: the actual cause of the window’s breaking 
is a throwing of a rock, whereas whatever is going on in the imagined alternative – call it 
a “preparing to execute a running kick” – is a different sort of event altogether, and so 
cannot be seen as a “variation” on the actual cause. But to say that is to do nothing 
more than to highlight that we have already somehow managed to impose a certain 
scheme for taxonomizing events as the explanatorily appropriate one. It is, evidently, 
acceptable  for  our  explanatory  purposes  to  classify  events  as  “throws” o r  a s  
“preparations to kick”, but not appropriate to use “disjunctive” classifications such 
as “throw or preparation to kick”. (For if it were appropriate, then the counterfactual 
scenario  in  which  Suzy  is  preparing  to  execute  a  running  kick  would c o u n t  a s  a  
variation on the actual scenario; after all, she’s doing the same sort of thing, just in a 
different way.) Why not? It seems to me we have not answered the original question, 
so much as forced it to take a different form. 
Can  we  simply  draw  on  the  natural/non-natural  distinction  (really:  the  more 
natural/less natural distinction), at this point? Perhaps as follows: A way of classifying 
events that lumps together Suzy’s actual throw with (inter alia) her counterfactual 
preparations-to-kick draws a much less natural distinction than a way of classifying 
that simply lumps together her actual and counterfactual throws; and it is for that 
reason that we achieve explanatory depth by deploying the latter classification, but not 
the former. Or, to put the point in terms of similarity, a counterfactual preparation-
to-kick is too dissimilar to the actual throw, as compared to counterfactual variations 
on  this  throw,  to  count  as  one  of  the  alternatives  among  which  we  need  to 
distinguish, in order to achieve explanatory depth. (And these similarity facts, in turn, 
are grounded in the facts about the less-than-perfectly-natural properties instantiated 
in the actual and counterfactual scenarios.) 
But this sort of appeal to the more/less natural distinction strikes me as far too 
cavalier. Given the problems raised in §1 for explaining what this distinction comes 
to, appealing to it doesn’t illuminate so much as label what we are trying to understand. 
And at any rate, the presupposition that we achieve explanatory depth by focusing 
on those nomologically possible alternative states of the given region of spacetime 
that count as variations on the actual throw – aiming to distinguish those of them that 
lead to a breaking from those that do not – is false. Consider a variation in which 
Suzy throws the rock with slightly bad aim, just missing the window – but throws the 
rock  so  hard  that  it  breaks  the  sound  barrier,  with  the  subsequent  sonic  boom 
shattering the window. We do not mean to classify this variation, either, together with 
variations  in  which  we  merely  ring  changes  on  the  rock’s  color,  etc.  And  this, 
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Again,  why  not?  Not  because  lumping  this  variation  together  with  the  others 
produces an overly “unnatural” classification. 
There  is a n  a n s w e r ,  o f  c o u r s e :  breaking  a  window  by  way  of  a  sonic  boom 
counts, as compared with breaking it via direct impact, as a sufficiently different way 
of causing it to break, that our explanatory purposes are ill-served by lumping them 
together. That answer is correct, as far as it goes. But, again, it’s a dead end to think 
that you can unpack that answer in some philosophically illuminating fashion by 
claiming that what makes our explanatory purposes ill-served in this way is that the 
classification in question is insufficiently natural.  
And now for a radical suggestion: it’s not just that this move leads to a dead end, 
it’s  that  it  gets  things  exactly  backwards.  What  makes  a  classification  that  blends 
breakings-via-impact together with breakings-via-sonic-boom unnatural is that it ill-
serves our explanatory purposes. In the remainder of this essay I am going to explore 
this idea. 
§4 Unification as a cognitive aim 
Let’s  recap.  A  very  good  idea  about  causal  explanation  is  that  what  we  are 
seeking,  when  we  set  out  to  acquire  such  explanations,  is  information  about 
particularly  distinctive  features  of,  or  patterns  in,  the  structure  of  localized 
counterfactual  dependence  that  our  world  exhibits.  One  sort  of  structure  in 
particular is the kind of structure knowledge of which gives our causal explanations 
“depth”: it is the structure constituted by facts about how the localized state of the 
world in one place and time counterfactually covaries with the state in another place 
and time. Put another way, we are not merely interested in knowing that what goes 
on here and now causes what goes on there and then; we are also interested in tracking 
how this causal relation remains stable under counterfactual variations in the cause. 
But we are, it has emerged, not interested in just any old variations: for it appears to 
be bad explanatory policy to track variations in the cause under which its causal 
relation to the effect still obtains, but in an overly different manner. And so we have 
arrived at the need to understand what these distinctions among “ways of causing “ 
are themselves grounded in. 
What I have suggested is that it is a mistake to turn to the more/less natural 
distinction  for  help,  because  that  distinction  itself  needs  to  be  grounded  in  an 
account of what makes for better or worse satisfaction of our explanatory purposes. 
I will argue for that suggestion indirectly, by outlining a way that our explanatory 
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natural  distinction,  and  by  leaving  it  a  pregnant  open  question  how  else  this 
distinction could be grounded. 
It would be going in a circle, at this point, to give an account of our explanatory 
aims that merely returned to the themes discussed in the last section, asserting that 
these  aims  consist  in  the  acquisition  of  causal  information  about  the  target 
explanandum. That is, of course, one of our aims, and a crucially important one at 
that; more generally, it seems to me that there is no way that we as scientific inquirers 
can come to an adequate understanding of our world, without knowledge of the 
metaphysical dependency relations (causal or otherwise) that knit it together. It’s just 
that that cannot be the whole philosophical story about explanation. And what we 
need, at this point in the dialectic, is precisely the other part of the story. I therefore 
propose that one of our aims, in trying to develop an understanding of our world, is, 
in addition, to develop cognitively effective means for organizing our information about the world, 
in particular causal information. 
That  idea  has  clear  connections  to  what,  in  the  philosophical  literature  on 
explanation,  has  gone  by  the  name  of  “unificationism”  –  which  is,  principally, 
Kitcher’s unificationist account of explanation (1989). On this account, very roughly, 
explanations  are  arguments  that  instantiate  very  widely  applicable  patterns  of 
argument. For reasons best left offstage, I do not think Kitcher’s account succeeds, 
so let me hereby alert you that I do not in any way mean to be drawing upon it. I 
appropriate the label “unificationist” simply because, like Kitcher, I think that one 
important  part  of  what  we  are  after  in  explanation  can  be  accurately  (if  very 
incompletely) described as the acquisition of a unifying picture of the world. 
Now, the idea that one of the central things we are after in explanation is the 
development of cognitively effective means for organizing our information stands 
desperately in need of development itself. I do not have a theory to offer of just what 
a “cognitively effective means of organizing” is (and not, alas, merely for reasons of 
lack of space). But it is easy enough to find evocative examples that, I think, do an 
extremely effective job of bringing out the unificationist strand in our thinking about 
explanation. Here is one that is slightly goofy, but for all that one of my favorites. 
Consider  the  following  initial  segment  of  an  infinite  sequence  of  natural 
numbers: 
1,1,1,2,3,2,1,3,5,4,2,5,7,8,3,7,9,16,5,11,11,32,8,13,13,64,13,17,… 
Perhaps you’ve figured out the rule that generates the sequence. Perhaps, on the 
other hand, you find it confusing. You don’t understand it. You don’t know why it has 
the form it does. If so, the following way of reorganizing the initial segment will make 
things crystal clear: 
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3,  2,  1,  3, 
5,  4,  2,  5, 
7,  8,  3,  7, 
9,  16,  5,  11, 
11, 32,  8,  13, 
13, 64,  13,  17,… 
Looking down the columns, we see that the sequence is just an interleaving of 
the odd numbers, powers of 2, fibonacci numbers, and prime numbers. Once you 
see  this,  you  understand  the  sequence.  But  not  by  acquiring  a  special  sort  of 
information  about  it.  (The  sequence  is,  after  all,  not  the  sort  of  thing  that  has 
“causes”, or that “metaphysically depends” on anything else.) To me, examples like 
this evoke in its purest form the idea that to understand some subject matter is to 
organize one’s information about it in the right sort of way. 
Not  surprisingly,  examples  with  this  particularly  clear  character  –  in  which 
explanatory  insight  is  achieved  not  at  all  via  the  provision  of  a  special  sort  of 
dependency information, but entirely by organizing the information we have in the 
right sort of way – are much easier to find in mathematics than in the sciences, 
simply  because  in  mathematics  the  only  kind  of  dependency  information  that’s 
available  is  information  about  logical  entailment,  and  that  only  gets  you  so  far, 
explanatorily  speaking.  Just  consider  the  fact  that  mathematicians  routinely 
distinguish  proofs  that  are  illuminating  from  proofs  that  aren’t;  and  yet  the 
unilluminating proofs are, for all that, proofs! So something else must ground the 
distinction. I suggest that the something else concerns how the illuminating proofs 
generalize to other results, how they highlight easily overlooked connections between 
their subject matter and other mathematical topics, and so on; in short, they are 
illuminating  to  the  extent  that  they  contribute  to  the  effective  organization  of 
mathematical knowledge.  
In the sciences, by contrast, explanation almost always involves the provision of 
interesting, distinctive dependency information, and for that reason it can be difficult 
to see that unificationist requirements on understanding also play an important role. 
Still,  some  examples  bring  out  these  requirements  rather  nicely.  Consider  the 
periodic table of the elements, which is unquestionably of immense value to us in 
enhancing our understanding of the chemical and atomic behavior of atoms, and 
which  has  this  value  precisely  because  of  the  brilliantly  effective  way  in  which  it 
organizes our information about this behavior. 
So  let’s  grant  that  explanation  even  in  the  empirical  sciences  involves  both 
distinctively metaphysical and distinctively psychological aspects: on the one hand, 
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metaphysically speaking – but on the other hand, we want our information, especially 
our dependency information, to be organized in the right sort of way – where what 
makes for good organization, presumably, depends on potentially quite idiosyncratic 
features of human psychology.
13 Then the next thing to notice is that what makes for 
good organization is very often going to be a holistic matter. 
Consider, again, the periodic table of the elements. To be sure, what makes this 
such a powerfully effective tool for understanding is in part that is a table of the 
elements: and the distinction between elements and non-elements does not obviously 
involve any holistic considerations. (Rather, it seems that we focus, for explanatory 
purposes, on elements simply because they are highly stable configurations of matter, 
and so the sorts of things about which it is possible to make useful generalizations 
concerning their behavior.) But it is the periodic table of the elements because of the 
way in which classifies elements into different chemical types. And what makes the 
particular scheme of classification built into the table so explanatorily superior to the 
multitude of logically possible rivals cannot, I think, be appreciated by examining its 
components piecemeal. It is not, as it were, that a certain amount of explanatory 
goodness attaches to any scheme that distinguishes noble gases from things that are 
not noble gases, and a certain additional amount of goodness attaches to any scheme 
that incorporates a distinction between metals and non-metals, and so on; with the 
overall  goodness  of  our  own  scheme  simply  being  the  sum  of  these  individual 
goodnesses. No, it is because of the way in which our scheme as a whole arranges our 
knowledge  of  the  chemical  and  atomic  features  of  the  elements  that  it  is  so 
explanatorily powerful. 
I think that something very similar happens – albeit in a fashion that is less 
rigorous, and much more difficult to discern – in our thinking about causation and 
causal processes. We saw above that we distinguish a breaking-via-sonic-boom as a 
sufficiently different way of breaking a window from a breaking-via-impact that it 
would be a bad mistake, given our explanatory aims, to count the latter sort of 
breaking as a variation on the former. It is enormously philosophically tempting to 
think that this distinction must be grounded entirely in features specific to the two 
kinds of breaking: just by, as it were, closely inspecting paradigm examples of the 
two kinds of breaking, one would be able to see that our explanatory aims require us 
to distinguish them as separate kinds.  
                                                 
13 Well,  maybe  not.  Maybe,  indeed,  the  very  possibility  of  rational  thought  requires  that 
understanding be achieved partly by the imposition of a priori principles of organization. If you’re 
obsessively concerned to preserve the pure, unadulterated objectivity of our explanatorily valuable 
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But I think that is a mistake. I think it is much more plausible that in coming to 
grips with the vast profusion of causal processes we encounter even in ordinary life, 
we very early on (and almost certainly unconsciously) hit upon certain schemes for 
organizing these processes into types. Now, to borrow an idea from Lewis’s work on 
laws  of  nature  (see  his  1983b,  and  also  Loewer  1996),  two  extremely  important 
desiderata we impose on candidate schemes (again, not consciously!) are, plausibly, 
the following
14: First, it’s good for a candidate scheme to be simple, not necessarily in 
the sense that it includes a small number of types, but perhaps in the sense that it 
makes use of a small number of basic parameters to characterize those types. Second, 
it’s good for a candidate scheme to have the resources needed to express powerful, 
informative  generalizations  about  causal  structure  (in  particular,  the  sorts  of 
generalizations  that  populate  the  special  sciences,  and  that  in  the  philosophical 
literature  typically  go,  misleadingly,  by  the  name  “ceteris  paribus  laws”).  These 
desiderata work in tension: consider that one way to get a simple scheme is to let the 
sole type of event be “event” and the sole type of causal process to be “causal 
process”. Whatever you said about the causal structure of the world, by means of 
this scheme, could be said quite simply. But not very informatively. It is immensely 
plausible  that  achieving  the  best  balance  between  these  desiderata  will  involve 
holistic considerations.  
Now, maybe it’s hubris to think that the schemes we humans have developed are 
the  best  possible,  for  purposes  of  effective  organization.  (Certainly,  one  of  the 
striking effects that a good scientific education can have on one is opening one’s eyes 
to the availability of very different schemes, that sometimes improve dramatically on 
our ordinary ones.) But I will suppose that they are good enough. At any rate, what I 
would  like  to  suggest  is  that  lumping  the  two  kinds  of  breakings  together  is  an 
explanatorily bad move not solely because of features intrinsic to paradigm instances 
of each, but because no scheme for organizing the vast amount of information we 
possess about the causal structure of our world that did so could possibly meet the 
desiderata on effective organization as well as the scheme we have arrived at. 
§5 Conclusion: mapping the large-scale joints of the world 
Let’s return now to the questions left over from section 1. How is it that the 
natural/non-natural distinction, as it appears at scales above the most mereologically 
                                                 
14 Not  the  only  two,  surely.  For  example,  it’s  plausibly  a  desideratum  that  a  scheme  for 
taxonomizing  events  and  causal  processes  not  yield  up  kinds  whose  membership  is  difficult  or 
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fundamental, is determined by the fundamental physical structure of the world (the 
structure given by the pattern of instantiation of perfectly natural properties, together 
with the fundamental laws of nature)? How does the structure of reality at the most 
fundamental levels determine the map of reality’s joints at less fundamental scales? 
The right answer, I think, is that it doesn’t – at least, not alone. The picture is rather 
the following: given how the world is fundamentally (where I take this to include: 
how  its  fundamental  laws  are),  the  world  has  a  perfectly  definite  localized 
dependence structure, which for purposes of keeping things simple (i.e., ignoring the 
complexities that cases of preemption introduce) we will take to just be its causal 
structure. But this structure does not, as it were, come equipped with a uniquely best 
way to describe it, even at a given scale. Rather, we impose on it various taxonomies 
– different ones for different scales, certainly, and sometimes even different ones at 
the same scale, given that it can sometimes be useful for us to highlight certain 
patterns  in  the  world’s  localized  dependence  structure  at  the  expense  of  others. 
These taxonomies sort events and the causal processes that knit them together into 
kinds, and do so subject to the constraint that the sorting provide us with maximally 
effective tools for organizing our view of the causal structure of the world at the 
given scale. The map of the large-scale joints of the world is just constituted by 
whatever distinctions figure in such optimal taxonomic schemes. 
It follows that, in a certain sense, the distinction between more and less natural 
properties  at  larger  mereological  scales  fails  to  be  perfectly  objective:  for  this 
distinction is determined in part by which taxonomic schemes do the best job for 
creatures like us of providing tools for the efficient and effective representation of 
causal structure. So it would be a bad mistake to think that what we are doing when 
we investigate the large-scale structure of the world is merely discovering the natural 
distinctions that are there to be drawn. But it would be just as bad a mistake to think 
that how to draw these distinctions is somehow entirely up to us. To say that is 
simply to forget that the fundamental physical structure of the world – which, I’m 
supposing, is what it is quite independently of facts about the structure of human 
cognition – is also an indispensable ingredient. In sum: It is a complex interplay 
between purely objective facts about reality’s physical structure, on the one hand, and 
psychological  facts  about  the  structure  of  human  cognition,  on  the  other,  that 
grounds the “joints” that nature exhibits at large scales.  
Now, just in case this point wasn’t obvious, what I am offering is not a proper 
theory of the more/less natural distinction. What Lewis offered, in his proposal that 
the naturalness of a property is fixed by the length of the shortest canonical predicate 
expressing it, was a proper theory. (Granted: it slips from “proper theory” back to 
“approach” if we amend it by saying that simplicity of the predicate also matters, The Large-Scale Joints of the World      25 
while leaving it vague how simplicity itself is to be measured, and how simplicity and 
length trade off.) What I have offered are remarks that point in the direction of a 
theory. My hope is that they point, at least, in the right direction. At any rate, they 
pretty clearly cry out for elaboration. 
Three avenues in particular seem to me worth pursuing. First, the picture I’ve 
sketched needs input from empirical psychology, since that is where we can hope for 
insight into how it is that organizing schemes in fact function in human cognition. 
Second, it would be helpful to explore how our taxonomizing strategies work when 
applied  to  toy  models  – C o n w a y ’s  game  of  “life”,  say.
15 Third  (and  relatedly),  it 
would be helpful to explore case studies from especially well-developed and mature 
special sciences – organic chemistry, say.  
It’s highly unlikely that the results of such inquiry will yield anything as pristine as 
Lewis’s account. No, it’s going to be messy – and, maybe, messy in case-specific 
ways. For example, the way the natural/nonnatural distinction plays out in organic 
chemistry may not be the same as the way it plays out in, say, evolutionary biology. 
But that’s to be expected, if indeed this distinction results from an interplay between 
facts about physical structure and facts about human cognition in the way I have 
suggested.  
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